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Abstract
Professional sports teams are important to their local economies, so successful franchises
are significant contributors to their prosperity. This need for successful teams drives the owners
and general managers to perform in-depth analyses on potential players to gain insight, so the
best players can be chosen. Major League Baseball is one of the largest sports leagues in the
world, so their analysis of players must be excellent to ensure they sign the best players and can
compete at a high level.
Baseball is a complex sport with many different statistics evaluating nearly every part of
a player’s game. Because of its complexity, professional baseball relies on statistics more than
any of the other professional sports. General managers and scouts for teams analyze players
using a variety of statistics, so ensuring current statistics that meet their needs are available is
vital. Continuously updating and developing new statistics is extremely important to keep
professional baseball near the top of the professional sports world. This analysis develops a new
offensive statistic for use by MLB teams when they consider what players to sign during free
agency. The approach used attempts to improve an existing statistic then combines the improved
statistic with another statistic to gain a new perspective on player analysis.
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1. Introduction
Major League Baseball (MLB) is the largest professional baseball league and the second
largest sports league in the world with over $10 billion in gross revenues in 2017 (Brown, 2017).
Because of the scope and importance of the league to the local economies, it is important for
teams to be well informed in their analysis of players. An important tool used by teams for
analyses is statistics. Using statistics, teams analyze batters based not only on how well they hit,
but also their ability to avoid getting out (Hakes & Sauer, 2006). The statistics, ranging from
simple to very complex, have not always been valued like they are today. In the middle of the
20th century, Branch Rickey was the first baseball executive to find value in statistics when
organizing his teams. He was a pioneer in baseball who created formulas that disproved myths
and proved what really wins (Rickey, 1954). Rickey’s ideas set the tone for what would come
half a century later.
Two ways that teams acquire players are through free agency and through trading with
other teams. Free agency is when teams make decisions regarding which players without current
contracts to sign. Trading is when teams exchange players or other resources such as cash or
future draft picks. Both trades and free agency decisions are risky because baseball is a very
unpredictable sport that allows the lesser-skilled teams to win on any given day (Jia, Wong, &
Zeng, 2013). MLB teams are always trying to gain an advantage in determining which players
will benefit their team the most. Winning games is the ultimate goal in baseball, so choosing
players who will help accomplish this is imperative. With the constant evolution of statistics to
try to determine the most effective measures for player analysis, experimentation of new metrics
to obtain a different perspective of players is important to develop the game for the future. The
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research I conducted aimed to first formulate a new statistic based on currently used metrics in
an effort to improve how players are analyzed and second, to formulate a new statistic combining
the first one I created and an existing one to find a new method for teams to evaluate free agent
players they might like to sign.

2. Literature Review
At some level, statistics have always been measured in baseball. In baseball, statistics can
be divided into two different categories: counting and rate. Counting statistics measure a player’s
total production without addressing how many plate appearances they have. On the other hand,
rate statistics are calculated by taking the number of successes a player has by the number of
opportunities (Use of Statistics, 2016). The use of statistics began with easy to quantify counting
statistics such as home runs, and innings pitched. As baseball has grown on the national scale,
the need for better statistical analyses has become necessary. In the 1970s, Bill James became
one of the first people to analyze baseball players using in-depth statistics. James coined the term
“sabermetrics” to define the analysis he was doing. James defined sabermetrics as “the search for
objective knowledge about baseball” (Birnbaum). Sabermetrics was the beginning of
development of many new rate statistics as well as a few, more complex, counting statistics.
The boom of sabermetrics sparked the interest of more people than just the few involved
with Bill James’ research. The desire to learn the most effective ways to identify the best players
eventually moved onto a larger scale when the Oakland Athletics (A’s) proposed the idea of
Moneyball. Because all MLB teams do not have the same budget, the ability to analyze players
effectively is especially important for less wealthy teams. The A’s were the first team to prove
how crucial statistical analysis is in baseball. The A’s are a small market team, so their budget is
not as large as other teams. Despite having either the lowest or second-lowest payroll in the
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MLB for consecutive seasons, the A’s fielded teams that were competitive with the teams with
the highest payrolls (Lewis, 2003). The general manager of the A’s, Billy Beane, realized the
competitive disadvantage his team faced, so he became more creative in his analysis of players.
The concept of Moneyball based the analysis of players on statistics not valued as highly by
other teams such as on base percentage to sign free agents’ or trade for players other teams
overlooked.
Batting average has always been the statistic that is the most popular among casual
baseball fans because of how easy it is to calculate and how clearly it impacts the game. Batting
average is calculated by dividing the number of hits for a player by the number of at bats they
have. It is important to note that walks and hit-by-pitch are not included in this calculation.
Hitters who have high batting averages consistently reach base via a hit. The players who are
viewed as being the best typically have one of, if not, the highest batting averages. Table 1
shown below describes the statistics that are most important to my research. These statistics are
used to calculate more advanced statistics such as batting average.
Table 1: Common batting statistics
Hit (H)

When a batter hits a ball into fair territory and
reached base safely without an error or
fielder’s choice.

Walk (BB)

When a pitcher throws four balls outside the
zone and the hitter does not swing at any of
them. The batter is awarded first base. Walks
do not count as an at-bat.
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Hit-by-pitch (HBP)

When a batter is struck by a pitched ball
without swinging at it. Hit-by-pitch
occurrences do not count as an at-bat.

At Bat (AB)

When a batter reaches base via a fielder’s
choice, hit, or an error, or when a batter is put
out on a non-sacrifice.

Plate Appearance (PA)

When a batter completes a turn at the plate.

Sacrifice Fly (SF)

When a batter hits a fly-ball out to the outfield
or foul territory that allows a runner to score.

Sacrifice Bunt (SH)

When a batter successfully advances one or
more runners by bunting the ball for an out.

Error (E)

When a fielder fails to make a play that the
official scorer judges an average fielder
would have made.

Run (R)

When a runner crosses the plate safely to
score.

Stolen Base (SB)

When a runner takes a base to which they
aren’t entitled.

Caught Stealing (CS)

When a runner is thrown out trying to steal a
base.

Intentional Walk (IBB)

When a batter is walked on purpose.

Strikeout (K)

When a hitter swings or looks at the third
strike of their at-bat.
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Like batting average, On-base percentage (OBP) is another statistic used to measure
player performance. As its name indicates, OBP measures how often a player gets on base
divided by the total number of plate appearances the player has. It considers all plate appearances
resulting in a hit, walk, or hit-by-pitch as positively affecting the value and all other plate
appearances as negatively affecting the value. Errors negatively affect OBP even though the
player did reach base safely. OBP is calculated using the formula below. Even though the
importance of OBP is not as widely recognized by casual baseball fans, it is a very important
statistic for small market MLB teams such as the A’s. OBP allows teams to compete despite a
low batting average because of their ability to get on base.

On Base Percentage =

Hits+Walks+Hit by Pitch
At bats+Sacrifice Flies+Walks+Hit by Pitch

OBP was made immensely more popular by Moneyball. Getting on base more often
causes multiple problems for the opposing defense. It not only provides the team a chance to
score, but it also affects the pitcher’s pitching motion as well as the defensive alignment (Lewis,
2003). Pitchers also are forced to throw more pitches, so they may become tired more quickly.
These differences in the defense put more pressure on them and give the team on offense a better
chance to score than simply having the runner on base.
Slugging percentage (SLG) is another statistic used to evaluate players. This statistic
measures a player’s ability to hit for power. Slugging percentage favors players who get more
doubles, triples, and home runs known as extra base hits because these types of hits are worth
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more total bases per at-bat. This metric is measured on a scale from 0.000 – 4.000 with a higher
value representing a better player.

Slugging percentage =

Total Bases
At Bats

On-base plus slugging (OPS) is a statistic combining OBP and SLG. OPS is used to
determine hitters who are well-rounded. A higher OPS indicates a player who is good at both
hitting for power and getting on base. The formula for OPS is shown below.

OPS = OBP + SLG

While OPS is an interesting statistic that is fairly effective at evaluating players, it is not
without its flaws. This statistic treats OBP and SLG as equal statistics in the calculation, but this
equal treatment does not fairly analyze players (Slowinski, 2010). This unequal treatment was
discussed in The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball. In this book, the authors explain
how calculating OPS using a 1.7 multiplier for OBP makes sense because of how much more
value it provides to the statistic (Tango, Lichtman, & Dolphin, 2007). My research aims to
explore an alternate way to account for the added value OBP adds to the statistic by taking the
current SLG formula and giving weight to walks. Walks are only given value currently in the
OBP formula, so adding them to the SLG formula will help even out the disparity in how much
value should be given to SLG and OBP when calculating OPS.
Bill James developed a new statistic to help evaluate players in more depth than just OPS
as well. His statistic, runs created (RC), is used to predict how many runs a player or team will
10

create based on their hitting statistics. Runs created allows teams to analyze players by seeing
how much they would contribute to their team if they signed them. This statistic is especially
important because it focuses on runs scored which is the goal of the offense in baaseball.
Rob Mains conducted a study of every team from 1914 to 2015 to see what the
relationship was between runs per game, SLG, OBP, OPS, and BA (Mains, 2016). The results of
his study are in Table 2 below. This table shows OPS is clearly the best indicator for runs scored
by a team. Because the correlation coefficient is not perfect, my goal is to create a statistic that is
even closer to the optimal value of 1.0.
Table 2: Rob Mains Correlation Results
Correlation Test

Correlation Coefficient

Runs per game vs. OBP

0.890

Runs per game vs. SLG

0.867

Runs per game vs. OPS

0.944

Runs per game vs. BA

0.812

Even though currently used statistics do a good job of measuring player performance,
purely evaluating players by weighting each plate appearance equally does not seem fair. This is
where situational hitting comes into play. Whether a player hits a home run in the first inning of
a regular season game or in the ninth inning of Game 7 of the World Series, its statistical
significance is the same. Situational hitting is a very important quality to teams. Hitters that are
categorized as being more “clutch” are more attractive to teams because they perform better in
high leverage situations. The abilities these players possess do not significantly change when
presented with situations where they are required to be “clutch”, so they are sought after when
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building rosters. “Clutchness” is a newer statistic being measured. The measure assigns in-game
situations a leverage index value and assesses players based on their performance in higher
leverage situations. If they perform at or below their normal averages on any given statistic, they
are said to not be very clutch. However, if they perform better in high leverage situations than
they do in “normal” situations, they are clutch. Using the statistics previously mentioned, my
research analyzes the best players and attempts to connect “clutchness“ to the newly developed
statistic.
To connect “clutchness” to the statistic, I researched how often a player bats in a “clutch”
situation on average. David Appleman writes about the leverage index which defines how
important a particular situation in a game is based on different measures. In his article, he
mentions that around 10% of all situations have a leverage index above 2 which indicates these
situations are the highest leverage. This leverage index is used to create the currently existing
clutch statistic on Fangraphs website.
For my research, I will use the statistic that is already developed to build an overall
statistic that measures a player’s ability to perform in both “clutch” and “normal” situations. A
detailed breakdown of the components of this statistic will be included in the methodology
section below. This new statistic can be used alongside currently existing statistics such as OPS
and batting average to give teams a different perspective on a certain player.

3. Methodology
This research project is broken down into three distinct phases: preliminary analysis, new
statistical formulation, and comparative analysis. The primary software I used for performing the
analysis was Excel. I used it to run correlations create new formulas and analyze the data for the
comparative analysis.
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3.1 Preliminary Analysis
The first phase is the initial data analysis phase. In this phase, I looked at currently used
statistics and identified how well they currently operate and the players who are the best using
the respective statistics. The insights gained from this initial analysis helped us better understand
the relationship between each of the statistics of interest and the players that performed the best
when analyzed using them.
“Clutchness” was the main statistic I investigated. To see which players were doing well
in this category, I gathered data from the previous twenty seasons on all qualifying players. A
qualifying player is simply a player who averages 3.1 plate appearances per game. This
eliminates players who do not play as much from being rewarded for it. The data I gathered
included the “clutchness” data as well as data on the batting average, slugging percentage, OPS,
and other frequently used statistics. I ran correlations on this data to see if there was any
relationship between “clutchness” and any of the other statistics of interest to me. Table 3 shows
the results of the analysis.
Table 3: Clutchness vs. Common Statistics Correlation Results
Comparison

Correlation Coefficient

Clutchness vs. OBP

0.04466

Clutchness vs. SLG

-0.03528

Clutchness vs. OPS

-0.00668

Clutchness vs. BA

0.07075

This analysis showed exactly what I was expecting to see. The overall abilities of a player
do not necessarily affect how clutch they are. This proves how important evaluating “clutchness”
is. Just because a player performs well in 90% of the situations they face, does not mean they
13

will perform well in high leverage situations. This initial analysis suggests creating a statistic
using “clutchness” could be useful for analyzing player performance.

3.2 New Statistic Formulation
In the second phase, I altered one of the currently used statistics, OPS. The goal of the
new statistic which I will call OPS* is to see if I could create a new statistic that more closely
reflects a team’s ability to score runs. When formulating the new statistic, I created four basic
variations to implement different aspects of a player’s performance. All variations of the statistic
are very similar to OPS, but they add more complexity to the formula. Each of the variations was
used to find the correlation between it and runs scored to see if an improvement from the original
OPS formula was found.
The first, most basic variations were created to evaluate each of the statistics separately.
Each of the statistics of interest (BB, HBP, IBB, SB) were plugged into the base slugging
formula shown below. This formula was then added to the existing OBP formula to form the new
OPS statistic.

SLG Alternative =

Total Bases + Candidate
At Bats + Candidate

OPS Alternative = OBP + SLG Alternative

The first variation shown below gives more weight to walks in the slugging percentage
formula. This extra weight is given to try to even out the apparent difference in weight between
OBP and SLG. The formula for the statistic is shown below.
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SLG* =

Total Bases + BB
At Bats + BB

OPS* = OBP + SLG*

The second variation gives more weight to HBP in the slugging percentage formula. Like
the formula using walks, this formula was developed to give players credit for earning their way
on base. Even though all players do not intentionally try to get hit, some players will crowd the
plate each at bat and the addition of this statistic rewards them for their actions. The formula for
the variation is shown below.

SLG$ =

Total Bases + HBP
At Bats + HBP

OPS$ = OBP + SLG$

The third variation accounts for intentional walks. Intentional walks are weighed
separately from non-intentional walks because they are not “earned” in the same way. Intentional
walks only occur in certain in-game situations, but I believed it was important to include them in
the analysis because better players are typically intentionally walked more. The variation is
shown below.

SLG^ =

Total Bases + IBB
At Bats + IBB
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OPS^ = OBP + SLG^

The next variation gives weight to stolen bases. This rewards faster players who bring
added pressure to the pitcher and catcher because of their ability to essentially stretch their hit
into a higher value hit by stealing a base. However, they will also be penalized for being caught
stealing. The formula for this variation is shown below.

SLG' =

Total Bases + SB - CS
At Bats

OPS' = OBP + SLG'

The final basic variation was designed to negatively affect players who strikeout often.
Strikeouts do not provide any advantages to the team because the ball is not put in play. Putting
the ball in play forces the other team to make a play and the possibility of reaching base or
advancing a runner who is already on base increases. In 2019, the total number of strikeouts
record was broken again just as it had been in each of the previous fourteen seasons. In the
current era of baseball, players value the homerun more highly than ever, but with this greater
effort to hit more homeruns often comes at the expense of more strikeouts. Because of this
number continuing to climb, including a formula for strikeouts was necessary. To find the exact
weight for what each strikeout should be worth, a sensitivity analysis was performed. The goal of
this analysis was to get the best correlation value versus runs scored. The results of this analysis
are discussed in the results section. The strikeouts formula is shown below.
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SLG# =

Total Bases - 0.07(K)
At Bats

OPS# = OBP + SLG#

Once the initial analysis of each of the five candidate statistics were performed, the
potential contributors to a final improved statistic were identified and this statistic was built.
Variations with all possible combinations of the chosen statistics were formulated to find the
final one. The final variation shown below includes stolen bases, walks, and strikeouts. The
results of the experimentation to find this statistic are in the results section.

SLG! =

Total Bases + SB - CS + BB - 0.07(K)
At Bats + BB

OPS! = OBP + SLG!

After the final variation of OPS was created, a new formula was created to evaluate the
overall value of a player. This statistic combines the final OPS variation with the clutch statistic
currently used. I called this statistic an Integrated Measure of Performance (IMP). This new
statistic aims to evaluate a player’s overall value for all situations. It gives a much greater weight
to OPS! because this statistic describes a player’s performance in any situation. Teams care more
about a player’s performance in general. For this statistic, I gave clutch situations a 10 percent
weight and all other situations a 90 percent weight because most players find themselves in high
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level “clutch” situations roughly 10 percent of the time. The statistic I formulated is shown
below.

IMP = 0.1 * Clutch + 0.9 * OPS!

3.3 Analysis
Finally, a two-part analysis was performed. The first part compared OPS with the
multiple variations of the new statistic. This analysis was a process that occurred during and
following the new statistical formulation phase. The first part of the analysis involved a
correlation between the OPS variations and runs scored just as Rob Mains performed. For my
research, I only used the data from the last 30 years instead of the more than one hundred
seasons he used.
The second part of the analysis evaluated the IMP. I first looked at how the IMP changed
over a player’s career. Because I had data from the last twenty seasons, I evaluated players who
began their careers in the early 2000s for this analysis. I also looked at how the IMP rated
players and compared this rating to their finish in the Most Valuable Player (MVP) race and their
Wins Above Replacement (WAR) total for the season. WAR is used to summarize a player’s
total contribution to their team into one statistic (Slowinski, 2010). WAR is known to be a very
good statistic for determining how good a player is at a specific aspect of the game. WAR is
divided into three different categories: Batting Runs, Base Running Runs, and Fielding Runs. For
the purposes of our study, I will only be considering their batting runs because I did not look at
fielding, and base running runs involves much more than just stolen bases.
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4. Results
The results are divided into two sections: the results for the new statistical formulation
and the results from the analysis of the IMP.

4.1 New Statistic Formulation
After doing the preliminary analysis using the existing statistics, I began the next phase
of developing the new statistic. I first ran baseline correlations to see how well the existing SLG
and OPS statistics predict runs scored. The data I used for these correlations spanned the last 30
seasons and included statistics for all teams in the league. After I had established the baseline, I
began experimenting with the different statistics to see if I could improve on the SLG and OPS
statistics.
I began by looking at each of the candidate statistics separately to see if they improved
the correlation by themselves. The full tables of correlations are shown in Tables 4 and 5. I will
now discuss each of the individual statistics and analyze the results of their testing.
The first addition to the statistic was walks. Because walks occur frequently and earning
them has the potential to advance runners, it was no surprise that the SLG statistic improved
significantly, and the OPS statistic improved slightly.
Next, I analyzed the impact of HBP. HBP is similar to walks in that it has the potential to
advance runners, but because they do not occur as frequently, it is not surprising to see that it did
not make the OPS or the SLG statistic any better.
I then looked at the intentional walks to see their impact. In a game, intentional walks are
usually only given in situations where runners will not advance or high leverage situations. For
this reason, it is not surprising that the OPS statistic did not improve. However, intentional walks
did improve the SLG statistic because they are like walks and HBPs in that they runner reaches
base safely.
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Net stolen bases was the next statistic I investigated. Because players who steal bases are
stretching their hit into essentially a hit that is worth one more base, it is not surprising that
stolen bases help predict runs score more effectively in both formulas.
The final statistic was strikeouts. To find the final version of this formula that I wanted to
use, I performed a sensitivity analysis with different percentages to subtract for each strikeout.
After the analysis, I settled on seven percent for every strikeout because it created the OPS#
value closest to the optimal value of 1.0. This formula proved to be effective for both SLG and
OPS because as I mentioned earlier, runners cannot be advanced when a player strikes out, so
strikeouts do not help score runs. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the correlations. Figures 1
and 2 represent correlation plots showing Runs vs. SLG + BB and Runs vs. OPS + (SLG +
HBP). The other correlation plots showing the results of these tests are shown in Figures 7-16 in
the Appendix.
Table 4: Runs vs. Base Slugging Alternatives Correlation Results
SLG Alternative Correlation

Correlation Coefficient

Runs vs. SLG

0.90067

Runs vs. SLG + BB

0.93084

Runs vs. SLG + HBP

0.89673

Runs vs. SLG + IBB

0.90482

Runs vs. SLG + SB

0.90518

Runs vs. SLG – 0.1K

0.91492

Runs vs. SLG – 0.15K

0.91810

Runs vs. SLG – 0.05K

0.90913

Runs vs. SLG – 0.07K

0.91176
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Table 5: Runs vs. Base OPS Alternatives Correlation Results
OPS Alternative Correlation

Correlation Coefficient

Runs vs. OPS

0.95253

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + BB)

0.95470

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + HBP)

0.95092

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + IBB)

0.95189

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + SB)

0.95393

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG - 0.1K)

0.95347

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG - 0.15K)

0.95213

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG - 0.05K)

0.95361

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG - 0.07K)

0.95370
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Figure 1: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/BB

Figure 2: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/HBP
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The combined final statistic showed improvement from the existing OPS statistic, but not
by very much. Because the existing statistic is already an excellent predictor of runs scored, there
was not much room for improvement. Tables 6 and 7 show the correlation for the slugging
percentage and OPS of each variation of the final statistic. They show that each of the
combinations of two of the three best predictors were very good, but the one that was chosen at
the end was the one combining all three. A plot of the final OPS correlation is also shown in
Figure 3, and all other correlation plots for SLG! and OPS! are in the Appendix as Figures 17-23.

Table 6: Runs vs. SLG! Alternatives Correlation Results
SLG! Alternatives Correlation

Correlation Coefficient

Runs vs. SLG + BB + SB – CS

0.93371

Runs vs. SLG + BB – 0.07K

0.94026

Runs vs. SLG + SB – CS – 0.07K

0.91514

Runs vs. SLG + BB + SB – CS – 0.07K

0.94452

Table 7: Runs vs. OPS! Alternatives Correlation Results
OPS! Alternatives Correlation

Correlation Coefficient

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + BB + SB - CS)

0.95574

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + BB – 0.07K)

0.95560

Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + SB – CS - 0.07K)

0.95464
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Runs vs. OPS + (SLG + BB + SB – CS - 0.07K)

0.95624

Figure 3: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB + BB - K

4.2 IMP Evaluation
After the final variation of OPS was formulated, I began to formulate the IMP. The goal
of the IMP was to create an overall statistic to evaluate players just as Bill James did with his
runs created (RC) statistic. For each of the last five seasons, tables showing the top 10 players
according to our IMP were created. Table 8 shows the 2019 leaders. The rest of the tables are in
the appendix as Tables 16-19.
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Table 8: 2019 IMP Leaders
Player

IMP

Christian Yelich

1.100

Matt Olson

1.067

Xander Bogaerts

1.017

Anthony Rendon

1.014

Bryce Harper

1.004

Anthony Rizzo

0.995

Mookie Betts

0.989

Michael Brantley

0.985

Max Muncy

0.985

Charlie Blackmon

0.971

Just like in every other sport, MLB players’ abilities regress as they get older. This
affects how well they perform in each of the main statistical categories. I decided to investigate
how players typically regress according to the IMP I developed. I looked at a few players who
began their careers in the early 2000s such as Albert Pujols, and I analyzed their regression over
time. The three players I investigated, Albert Pujols, David Ortiz, and Carlos Beltran, showed
different patterns in their IMP scores. Overall, all three players showed a few seasons where they
peaked, then a gradual decline occurred. This was most noticeable in Albert Pujols. David Ortiz
decline was less dramatic because he had seasons at the end of his career where he had much
higher numbers than the surrounding seasons. Figure 4 shows the results of this analysis. Figure
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5 also shows the same players’ results for OPS over the same time period. The OPS analysis
shows more of a gradual decline and no clear peak for the players like there was in the IMP. The
peak in the IMP appears as though it was only caused by the players having peak “clutchness”
years at the same time they were having good OPS seasons as shown by Figure 6. The
underlying statistics for these analyses are shown in Tables 36-38 in the Appendix.

IMP vs. Year
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Figure 4: Graph Showing IMP Values Over Time
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Figure 5: Graph Showing OPS Values Over Time

Clutchness vs. Year
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Figure 6: Graph Showing Clutchness Values Over Time

An analysis of how the top players ranked according to MVP voting and WAR was the
final analysis of the IMP I created. For each of the last twenty seasons, I gathered the top five
position players according to WAR total and the top five finishers in the MVP race. I then
compared where they finished according to the IMP score. The goal of this comparison was for
the sum of the rankings to be less than 50. This would mean that all five players on average were
in the top 10 of the IMP ranking system. However, after looking at the results of this analysis, it
appears as though the statistic I have developed is not a good predictor of who the MVP should
be. For some seasons, the results did come out close to what I was hoping they would, but for
others, they were very far off because at least one of the players was extremely “unclutch”.
I did not want to come to this conclusion based solely upon one or two bad seasons, so I
continued investigating. I consistently found the results to be outside the desired range. Out of
the ten separate races tested, only three qualified as being acceptable. The two tables below show
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the MVP races from two different seasons. Table 9 shows a fairly normal race where all the
players placed moderately high in the IMP ranking, and their total ranking barely met the
minimum requirement. Table 10 shows one of the extreme seasons where two of the players
were extremely “unclutch”, so the overall IMP ranking was more than three times the desired
outcome. The rest of the IMP Ranking Tables are shown as Tables 20-27 in the Appendix. For
each of the tables, the order of finish for the MVP voting is the same as the order the players are
listed in the table.
Table 9: 2017 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Giancarlo Stanton

22

Joey Votto

5

Paul Goldschmidt

30

Nolan Arenado

1

Charlie Blackmon

7

Total

65

Table 10: 2017 AL MVP Race IMP Ranking Table
Player

IMP Ranking

Jose Altuve

14

Aaron Judge

65

Jose Ramirez

74

Mike Trout

4

Francisco Lindor

7

28

Total

164

Whenever I evaluated the players according to their WAR total for the season, the results
were not much different than the MVP results. In general, players who have a higher WAR are
better, so the media typically votes them at the top of the MVP race. Due to this, a maximum of
only one or two players out of the top five changed from MVP to WAR for each of the seasons I
analyzed. A table showing the WAR totals for the NL and AL in 2019 are shown below. There is
only one player different from the MVP race above in both leagues, so the total is worse for both,
but in general these changes did not affect the total significantly. Tables 11 and 12 show how the
WAR leaders for both leagues did in our IMP Rankings for the 2019 season. The rest of the
tables showing the results of this analysis are Tables 28-35 in the Appendix.

Table 11: 2019 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Christian Yelich

1

Ketel Marte

21

Cody Bellinger

14

Anthony Rendon

2

Pete Alonso

22

Total

60
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Table 12: 2019 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Mike Trout

7

Alex Bregman

14

Marcus Semien

31

Xander Bogaerts

2

Rafael Devers

26

Total

80

I also created a table to analyze the top 20 players in five different categories of interest
for my research. In Table 13, the leaders for each of five categories are shown. For the first three
categories, the top players are not undervalued by teams. OPS and offensive WAR are wellknown among the decision makers, and OPS! is not a huge variation from OPS, so their analysis
using it would probably not change too much. The last two columns show statistics that would
not be at the top of the list for general managers when they analyze players. The IMP showed six
players who did not appear on any of the three main lists, so they may be undervalued. One
player, Matt Olson, was even rated as the second-best player according to my IMP. Using the
IMP to analyze players could allow teams to sign them at much lower cost. Finding these players
was the one of the main goals I had when I created this statistic.
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Table 13: 2019 Offensive Leaders
OPS

OPS!

oWAR

Clutchness

IMP

Normalized IMP

Christian Yelich

Christian Yelich

Mike Trout

Matt Olson

Christian Yelich

Christian Yelich

Mike Trout

Mike Trout

Alex Bregman

Alex Gordon

Matt Olson

Mike Trout

Cody Bellinger

Cody Bellinger

Marcus Semien

Jose Iglesias

Xander Bogaerts

Anthony Rendon

Nelson Cruz

Alex Bregman

Christian Yelich

Michael Brantley

Anthony Rendon

Cody Bellinger

Alex Bregman

Anthony Rendon

Xander Bogaerts

Jean Segura

Bryce Harper

Alex Bregman

Anthony Rendon

Nelson Cruz

Cody Bellinger

Matt Chapman

Anthony Rizzo

Nelson Cruz

Ketel Marte

Juan Soto

Ketel Marte

Bryce Harper

Mookie Betts

Mookie Betts

George Springer

Ketel Marte

Anthony Rendon

Shin-Soo Choo

Michael Brantley

Xander Bogaerts

Nolan Arenado

George Springer

Rafael Devers

Kevin Newman

Max Muncy

Juan Soto

Juan Soto

Nolan Arenado

Pete Alonso

Xander Bogaerts

Charlie Blackmon

Anthony Rizzo

Pete Alonso

Mookie Betts

Jorge Polanco

Adam Frazier

Freddie Freeman

Freddie Freeman

Charlie Blackmon

Freddie Freeman

Mookie Betts

Evan Longoria

Ronald Acuna Jr.

Nolan Arenado

Xander Bogaerts

Carlos Santana

DJ LeMahieu

Max Muncy

Shin-Soo Choo

George Springer

J.D. Martinez

Xander Bogaerts

George Springer

David Fletcher

Trea Turner

Ketel Marte

Freddie Freeman

Anthony Rizzo

Yoan Moncada

Wilson Ramos

Matt Chapman

Bryce Harper

Josh Bell

J.D. Martinez

Nolan Arenado

Anthony Rizzo

Nolan Arenado

Carlos Santana

Eugenio Suarez

Josh Bell

Trevor Story

Charlie Blackmon

Kris Bryant

Max Muncy

Anthony Rizzo

Pete Alonso

Juan Soto

Trea Turner

Mike Trout

Matt Olson

Austin Meadows

Trevor Story

Ronald Acuna Jr.

Ronald Acuna Jr.

Bryan Reynolds

Ronald Acuna Jr.

Jorge Soler

Josh Donaldson

Matt Chapman

Paul Goldschmidt

Carlos Santana

Charlie Blackmon
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After I ran the analysis on the IMP, I realized that normalizing the “clutchness” part of
the IMP had the potential make the statistic better. Because most players have OPS scores
between 0 and 1 while the range for clutchness is typically -2 to 2. Because the formula treats
them like they are the same, the analysis made it seem as though a normalization would make the
formula better. Normalizing “clutchness” will create a more fair balance of “clutchness” and
day-to-day performance. When I normalized “clutchness” by dividing it by two, the resulting
correlation coefficient versus runs scored was 0.31414. I then normalized it again by dividing
“clutchness” by four. The resulting correlation coefficient versus runs scored was 0.50938. Both
of these values being closer to the optimal value of 1.0 indicate that normalization may be a
better process for developing this statistic. Further sensitivity analysis could be done in the future
to improve the statistic. Table 14 shows the 2019 players rankings according to the second
normalization and compares the rankings to the original IMP. This table ranks the higher ranked
OPS! and WAR players much higher than the original IMP.

32

Table 14: 2019 Normalized IMP Leaders
Player

Normalized IMP

Original IMP Ranking

Christian Yelich

1.072

1

Mike Trout

1.004

18

Anthony Rendon

0.968

4

Cody Bellinger

0.959

24

Alex Bregman

0.947

31

Nelson Cruz

0.933

21

Mookie Betts

0.916

7

Xander Bogaerts

0.915

3

Juan Soto

0.911

28

Anthony Rizzo

0.909

6

5. Conclusion
Baseball is a continuously evolving game. Players change their approaches frequently to
gain an advantage. These nuances are what make baseball so unique. Every player plays the
game differently, so new statistics are being created frequently to evaluate players according to
their specifications. The performance measure I created can be used to look at players in a
different way than they previously have been. Combining regular and clutch performance gives
teams a new way to look at players.
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Table 14 shows the correlation values for each of the main overall offensive statistics used.
WAR is clearly the best, and the new OPS statistic created is the second best. While the IMP is
not very good at predicting runs scored, it can still be used alongside other statistics to evaluate
the situational capabilities of players and to find players who may be undervalued.
The normalized IMP rating system would be a better rating system for MLB players. The
normalization gives less value to “clutchness”, so while more of the best players will still be at
the top of the rankings, some undervalued players will still be shown because of their “clutch”
ability.
Table 15: Runs vs. Offensive Statistics
Correlation

Correlation Coefficient

Runs scored vs. OPS

0.95259

Runs scored vs. OPS!

0.95356

Runs scored vs. WAR

0.99180

Runs scored vs. IMP

0.197823

Runs scored vs. Normalized IMP

0.50938

6. Future Work
This research can be furthered by finding an even better statistic to predict runs scored or
to better predict another measure of player performance and make the baseball statistics field
even better. The analysis showed that adding the “clutchness” statistic made some players much
better and some much worse. Finding the balance between OPS! and “clutchness” for the IMP I
created could make this an even more useful statistic. The normalization process I did after the
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rest of my analysis had been completed should be further investigated through a sensitivity
analysis to find this balance.
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8. Appendices

Figure 7: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG

Figure 8: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/HBP
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Figure 9: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/IBB

Figure 10: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB
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Figure 11: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/K

Figure 12: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS
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Figure 13: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/BB

Figure 14: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/IBB
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Figure 15: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/SB

Figure 16: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/K
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Figure 17: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB + BB

Figure 18: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/BB - K
42

Figure 19: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB - K

Figure 20: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. SLG w/SB + BB - K
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Figure 21: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/SB + BB

Figure 22: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/BB - K
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Figure 23: Correlation Plot for Runs vs. OPS w/SB – K

Table 16: 2018 IMP Leaders
Player

IMP

Alex Bregman

1.040

Mookie Betts

1.026

Xander Bogaerts

0.997

Andrew Benintendi

0.989

J.D. Martinez

0.984

Christian Yelich

0.938

Gregory Polanco

0.935

Nelson Cruz

0.920

Brian Anderson

0.893

Manny Machado

0.884
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Table 17: 2017 IMP Leaders
Player

IMP

Nolan Arenado

1.042

Marwin Gonzales

1.025

Anthony Rizzo

0.989

Cody Bellinger

0.981

Mookie Better

0.976

George Springer

0.953

Mike Trout

0.945

Joe Mauer

0.933

Jake Lamb

0.924

Joey Votto

0.920

46

Table 18: 2016 IMP Leaders
Player

IMP

Adrian Beltre

1.003

Mike Trout

0.962

Jose Ramirez

0.957

Joey Votto

0.947

Dustin Pedroia

0.945

Bryce Harper

0.943

Charlie Blackmon

0.936

Elvis Andrus

0.910

Paul Goldschmidt

0.908

Yoenis Cespedes

0.905
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Table 19: 2015 IMP Leaders
Player

IMP

Anthony Rizzo

1.028

Miguel Cabrera

1.027

Andrew McCutchen

1.016

Eric Hosmer

1.013

Matt Carpenter

0.994

Lorenzo Cain

0.991

Kris Bryant

0.987

Paul Goldschmidt

0.986

Mitch Moreland

0.957

Carlos Gonzalez

0.957

Table 20: 2019 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Cody Bellinger

14

Christian Yelich

1

Anthony Rendon

2

Ketel Marte

21

Ronald Acuna Jr.

8

Total

46

48

Table 21: 2019 AL MVP IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Mike Trout

7

Alex Bregman

14

Marcus Semien

31

DJ LeMahieu

13

Xander Bogaerts

2

Total

67

Table 22: 2018 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Christian Yelich

1

Javier Baez

26

Nolan Arenado

12

Freddie Freeman

24

Paul Goldschmidt

5

Total

68
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Table 23: 2018 AL MVP Race IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Mookie Betts

2

Mike Trout

12

Jose Ramirez

24

J.D. Martinez

5

Alex Bregman

1

Total

44

Table 24: 2016 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Kris Bryant

55

Daniel Murphy

20

Corey Seager

47

Anthony Rizzo

9

Nolan Arenado

6

Total

137
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Table 25: 2016 AL MVP Race IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Mike Trout

2

Mookie Betts

15

Jose Altuve

11

Josh Donaldson

9

Manny Machado

27

Total

64

Table 26: 2015 NL MVP Race IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Bryce Harper

13

Paul Goldschmidt

4

Joey Votto

7

Anthony Rizzo

1

Andrew McCutchen

2

Total

27
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Table 27: 2015 AL MVP Race IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Josh Donaldson

10

Mike Trout

7

Lorenzo Cain

3

Manny Machado

52

Nelson Cruz

18

Total

90

Table 28: 2018 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Christian Yelich

1

Trevor Story

17

Javier Baez

26

Nolan Arenado

12

Paul Goldschmidt

5

Total

61
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Table 29: 2018 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Mike Trout

12

Mookie Betts

2

Jose Ramirez

24

Alex Bregman

1

J.D. Martinez

5

Total

44

Table 30: 2017 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Giancarlo Stanton

22

Charlie Blackmon

7

Joey Votto

5

Kris Bryant

57

Justin Turner

18

Total

109
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Table 31: 2017 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Jose Altuve

14

Mike Trout

4

Aaron Judge

69

Jose Ramirez

64

Carlos Correa

45

Total

196

Table 32: 2016 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Kris Bryant

55

Corey Seager

47

Daniel Murphy

20

Freddie Freeman

33

Jean Segura

30

Total

185
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Table 33: 2016 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Mike Trout

2

Jose Altuve

11

Josh Donaldson

9

Carlos Correa

20

Mookie Betts

15

Total

57

Table 34: 2015 NL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Bryce Harper

13

Joey Votto

7

Paul Goldschmidt

4

Andrew McCutchen

2

AJ Pollock

21

Total

47
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Table 35: 2015 AL WAR Leaders IMP Ranking
Player

IMP Ranking

Mike Trout

7

Josh Donaldson

10

Nelson Cruz

18

Manny Machado

52

Adam Eaton

15

Total

102

Table 36: Yearly IMP Totals
Albert
David
Carlos
Year
Pujols
Ortiz
Beltran
2002
0.855
0.735
0.894
2003
0.925
0.928
0.862
2004
0.963
0.889
0.980
2005
0.831
1.269
0.798
2006
1.361
1.136
1.098
2007
0.980
0.838
0.773
2008
1.036
0.765
0.981
2009
1.117
0.777
0.935
2010
0.898
0.822
0.721
2011
0.895
0.736
0.771
2012
0.894
0.948
0.831
2013
0.751
0.798
0.656
2014
0.740
0.949
0.713
2015
0.550
0.741
0.706
2016
0.815
0.888
0.739
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Table 37: Yearly OPS Totals
Albert
Year
Pujols
2002
0.955
2003
1.106
2004
1.072
2005
1.039
2006
1.102
2007
0.997
2008
1.114
2009
1.101
2010
1.011
2011
0.906
2012
0.859
2013
0.767
2014
0.79
2015
0.787
2016
0.78

David
Ortiz
0.839
0.961
0.983
1.001
1.049
1.066
0.877
0.794
0.899
0.953
1.026
0.959
0.873
0.913
1.021

Carlos
Beltran
0.847
0.911
0.915
0.744
0.982
0.878
0.876
0.915
0.768
0.91
0.842
0.83
0.703
0.808
0.85

Table 38: Yearly Clutchness Totals
Albert
Year
Pujols
2002
-0.35
2003
-1.02
2004
-0.33
2005
-1.64
2006
3.26
2007
0.38
2008
-0.17
2009
0.67
2010
-0.69
2011
0.37
2012
0.88
2013
0.25
2014
-0.01
2015
-1.87
2016
0.81

David
Ortiz
-0.43
0.36
-0.18
3.31
1.48
-1.68
-0.76
0.27
-0.22
-1.61
-0.13
-1.08
1.23
-1.16
-0.66

Carlos
Beltran
0.68
-0.54
0.65
0.8
1.49
-0.79
1.17
0.37
-0.25
-0.89
0.33
-1.08
0.47
-0.47
-0.38
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